The Art of War | Sun Tzu

Sun Tzu on The Art of War. This book is a Public Domain publication.

THE OLDEST MILITARY TREATISE IN THE WORLD. Translated from the Chinese with Introduction and Critical Notes

BY

LIONEL GILES, M.A.

Assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed Books and MSS. in the British Museum 1910

To my brother Captain Valentine Giles, R.G. in the hope that a work 2400 years old may yet contain lessons worth consideration by the soldier of today this translation is affectionately dedicated.

Contents

When Lionel Giles began his translation of Sun Tzu’s Art of War, the work was virtually unknown in Europe.

Its introduction to Europe began in 1782 when a French Jesuit Father living in China, Joseph Amiot, acquired a copy of it, and translated it into French. It was not a good translation because, according to Dr. Giles, “[I]t contains a great deal that Sun Tzu did not write, and very little indeed of what he did.”

The first translation into English was published in 1905 in Tokyo by Capt. E.
F. Calthrop, R.F.A. However, this translation is, in the words of Dr. Giles,
“excessively bad.” He goes further in this criticism: “It is not merely a
question of downright blunders, from which none can hope to be wholly exempt.
Omissions were frequent; hard passages were willfully distorted or slurred
over. Such offenses are less pardonable. They would not be tolerated in any
edition of a Latin or Greek classic, and a similar standard of honesty ought to
be insisted upon in translations from Chinese.” In 1908 a new edition of Capt.
Calthrop’s translation was published in London. It was an improvement on the
first—omissions filled up and numerous mistakes corrected—but new
errors were created in the process. Dr. Giles, in justifying his translation,
wrote: “It was not undertaken out of any inflated estimate of my own powers;
but I could not help feeling that Sun Tzu deserved a better fate than had
befallen him, and I knew that, at any rate, I could hardly fail to improve on
the work of my predecessors.”

Clearly, Dr. Giles’ work established much of the groundwork for the work of
later translators who published their own editions. Of the later editions of
the Art of War I have examined; two feature Giles’ edited translation
and notes, the other two present the same basic information from the ancient
Chinese commentators found in the Giles edition. Of these four, Giles’ 1910
edition is the most scholarly and presents the reader an incredible amount of
information concerning Sun Tzu’s text, much more than any other translation.

The Giles’ edition of the Art of War, as stated above, was a scholarly
work. Dr. Giles was a leading sinologue at the time and an assistant in the
Department of Oriental Printed Books and Manuscripts in the British Museum.
Apparently he wanted to produce a definitive edition, superior to anything else
that existed and perhaps something that would become a standard translation. It
was the best translation available for 50 years. But apparently there was not
much interest in Sun Tzu in English-speaking countries since it took the start
of the Second World War to renew interest in his work. Several people published
unsatisfactory English translations of Sun Tzu. In 1944, Dr. Giles’ translation
was edited and published in the United States in a series of military science
books. But it wasn’t until 1963 that a good English translation (by Samuel B.
Griffith and still in print) was published that was an equal to Giles’
translation. While this translation is more lucid than Dr. Giles’ translation,
it lacks his copious notes that make his so interesting.

Dr. Giles produced a work primarily intended for scholars of the Chinese
civilization and language. It contains the Chinese text of Sun Tzu, the English
translation, and voluminous notes along with numerous footnotes. Unfortunately,
some of his notes and footnotes contain Chinese characters; some are completely
Chinese. Thus, a conversion to a Latin alphabet etext was difficult. I did the
conversion in complete ignorance of Chinese (except for what I learned while
doing the conversion). Thus, I faced the difficult task of paraphrasing it
while retaining as much of the important text as I could. Every paraphrase
represents a loss; thus I did what I could to retain as much of the text as
possible. Because the 1910 text contains a Chinese concordance, I was able to
transliterate proper names, books, and the like at the risk of making the text
more obscure. However, the text, on the whole, is quite satisfactory for the
casual reader, a transformation made possible by conversion to an etext.
However, I come away from this task with the feeling of loss because I know
that someone with a background in Chinese can do a better job than I did; any
such attempt would be welcomed.

Bob Sutton

Preface by Lionel Giles

The seventh volume of Mémoires concernant l’histoire, les sciences, les
arts, les mœurs, les usages, &c., des Chinois is devoted to the Art of
War, and contains, amongst other treatises, “Les Treize Articles de
Sun-tse,” translated from the Chinese by a Jesuit Father, Joseph Amiot.
Père Amiot appears to have enjoyed no small reputation as a sinologue in his
day, and the field of his labours was certainly extensive. But his so-called
translation of the Sun Tzu, if placed side by side with the original, is seen
at once to be little better than an imposture. It contains a great deal that
Sun Tzu did not write, and very little indeed of what he did. Here is a fair
specimen, taken from the opening sentences of chapter 5:—

De l’habileté dans le gouvernement des Troupes. Sun-tse dit : Ayez
les noms de tous les Officiers tant généraux que subalternes; inscrivez-les
dans un catalogue à part, avec la note des talents & de la capacité de
chacun d’eux, afin de pouvoir les employer avec avantage lorsque
l’occasion en sera venue. Faites en sorte que tous ceux que vous devez
commander soient persuadés que votre principale attention est de les préserver
de tout dommage. Les troupes que vous ferez avancer contre l’ennemi
doivent être comme des pierres que vous lanceriez contre des œufs. De vous à
l’ennemi il ne doit y avoir d’autre différence que celle du fort au
faible, du vide au plein. Attaquez à découvert, mais soyez vainqueur en secret.
Voilà en peu de mots en quoi consiste l’habileté & toute la
perfection même du gouvernement des troupes.

Throughout the nineteenth century, which saw a wonderful development in the
study of Chinese literature, no translator ventured to tackle Sun Tzu, although
his work was known to be highly valued in China as by far the oldest and best
compendium of military science. It was not until the year 1905 that the first
English translation, by Capt. E.F. Calthrop. R.F.A., appeared at Tokyo under
the title “Sonshi”(the Japanese form of Sun Tzu). Unfortunately, it
was evident that the translator’s knowledge of Chinese was far too scanty
to fit him to grapple with the manifold difficulties of Sun Tzu. He himself
plainly acknowledges that without the aid of two Japanese gentlemen “the
accompanying translation would have been impossible.” We can only wonder,
then, that with their help it should have been so excessively bad. It is not
merely a question of downright blunders, from which none can hope to be wholly
exempt. Omissions were frequent; hard passages were wilfully distorted or
slurred over. Such offences are less pardonable. They would not be tolerated in
any edition of a Greek or Latin classic, and a similar standard of honesty
ought to be insisted upon in translations from Chinese.

From blemishes of this nature, at least, I believe that the present translation
is free. It was not undertaken out of any inflated estimate of my own powers;
but I could not help feeling that Sun Tzu deserved a better fate than had
befallen him, and I knew that, at any rate, I could hardly fail to improve on
the work of my predecessors. Towards the end of 1908, a new and revised edition
of Capt. Calthrop’s translation was published in London, this time,
however, without any allusion to his Japanese collaborators. My first three
chapters were then already in the printer’s hands, so that the criticisms
of Capt. Calthrop therein contained must be understood as referring to his
earlier edition. This is on the whole an improvement on the other, thought
there still remains much that cannot pass muster. Some of the grosser blunders
have been rectified and lacunae filled up, but on the other hand a certain
number of new mistakes appear. The very first sentence of the introduction is
startlingly inaccurate; and later on, while mention is made of “an army
of Japanese commentators” on Sun Tzu (who are these, by the way?), not a
word is vouchsafed about the Chinese commentators, who nevertheless, I venture
to assert, form a much more numerous and infinitely more important
“army.”

A few special features of the present volume may now be noticed. In the first
place, the text has been cut up into numbered paragraphs, both in order to
facilitate cross-reference and for the convenience of students generally. The
division follows broadly that of Sun Hsing-yen’s edition; but I have
sometimes found it desirable to join two or more of his paragraphs into one. In
quoting from other works, Chinese writers seldom give more than the bare title
by way of reference, and the task of research is apt to be seriously hampered
in consequence. With a view to obviating this difficulty so far as Sun Tzu is
concerned, I have also appended a complete concordance of Chinese characters,
following in this the admirable example of Legge, though an alphabetical
arrangement has been preferred to the distribution under radicals which he
adopted. Another feature borrowed from “The Chinese Classics” is
the printing of text, translation and notes on the same page; the notes,
however, are inserted, according to the Chinese method, immediately after the
passages to which they refer. From the mass of native commentary my aim has
been to extract the cream only, adding the Chinese text here and there when it
seemed to present points of literary interest. Though constituting in itself an
important branch of Chinese literature, very little commentary of this kind has
hitherto been made directly accessible by translation.

I may say in conclusion that, owing to the printing off of my sheets as they
were completed, the work has not had the benefit of a final revision. On a
review of the whole, without modifying the substance of my criticisms, I might
have been inclined in a few instances to temper their asperity. Having chosen
to wield a bludgeon, however, I shall not cry out if in return I am visited
with more than a rap over the knuckles. Indeed, I have been at some pains to
put a sword into the hands of future opponents by scrupulously giving either
text or reference for every passage translated. A scathing review, even from
the pen of the Shanghai critic who despises “mere translations,”
would not, I must confess, be altogether unwelcome. For, after all, the worst
fate I shall have to dread is that which befell the ingenious paradoxes of
George in The Vicar of Wakefield.

INTRODUCTION

Sun Wu and his Book

Ssu-ma Ch’ien gives the following biography of Sun Tzu: [1]

Sun Tzu Wu was a native of the Ch’i State. His Art of War brought
him to the notice of Ho Lu, [2] King of Wu. Ho Lu said to him:

“I have carefully perused your 13 chapters. May I submit your theory of
managing soldiers to a slight test?”

Sun Tzu replied: “You may.”

Ho Lu asked: “May the test be applied to women?”

The answer was again in the affirmative, so arrangements were made to bring 180
ladies out of the Palace. Sun Tzu divided them into two companies, and placed
one of the King’s favorite concubines at the head of each. He then bade them
all take spears in their hands, and addressed them thus: “I presume you know
the difference between front and back, right hand and left hand?”

The girls replied: Yes.

Sun Tzu went on: “When I say “Eyes front,” you must look straight ahead. When I
say “Left turn,” you must face towards your left hand. When I say “Right turn,”
you must face towards your right hand. When I say “About turn,” you must face
right round towards your back.”

Again the girls assented. The words of command having been thus explained, he
set up the halberds and battle-axes in order to begin the drill. Then, to the
sound of drums, he gave the order “Right turn.” But the girls only burst out
laughing. Sun Tzu said: “If words of command are not clear and distinct, if
orders are not thoroughly understood, then the general is to blame.”

So he started drilling them again, and this time gave the order “Left turn,”
whereupon the girls once more burst into fits of laughter. Sun Tzu: “If words
of command are not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood,
the general is to blame. But if his orders are clear, and the soldiers
nevertheless disobey, then it is the fault of their officers.”

So saying, he ordered the leaders of the two companies to be beheaded. Now the
king of Wu was watching the scene from the top of a raised pavilion; and when
he saw that his favorite concubines were about to be executed, he was greatly
alarmed and hurriedly sent down the following message: “We are now quite
satisfied as to our general’s ability to handle troops. If we are bereft of
these two concubines, our meat and drink will lose their savor. It is our wish
that they shall not be beheaded.”

Sun Tzu replied: “Having once received His Majesty’s commission to be the
general of his forces, there are certain commands of His Majesty which, acting
in that capacity, I am unable to accept.”

Accordingly, he had the two leaders beheaded, and straightway installed the
pair next in order as leaders in their place. When this had been done, the drum
was sounded for the drill once more; and the girls went through all the
evolutions, turning to the right or to the left, marching ahead or wheeling
back, kneeling or standing, with perfect accuracy and precision, not venturing
to utter a sound. Then Sun Tzu sent a messenger to the King saying: “Your
soldiers, Sire, are now properly drilled and disciplined, and ready for your
majesty’s inspection. They can be put to any use that their sovereign may
desire; bid them go through fire and water, and they will not disobey.”

But the King replied: “Let our general cease drilling and return to camp. As
for us, We have no wish to come down and inspect the troops.”

Thereupon Sun Tzu said: “The King is only fond of words, and cannot translate
them into deeds.”

After that, Ho Lu saw that Sun Tzu was
one who knew how to handle an army, and finally appointed him general. In the
west, he defeated the Ch’u State and forced his way into Ying, the
capital; to the north he put fear into the States of Ch’i and Chin, and
spread his fame abroad amongst the feudal princes. And Sun Tzu shared in the
might of the King.

About Sun Tzu himself this is all that Ssu-ma Ch’ien has to tell us in
this chapter. But he proceeds to give a biography of his descendant, Sun Pin,
born about a hundred years after his famous ancestor’s death, and also the
outstanding military genius of his time. The historian speaks of him too as Sun
Tzu, and in his preface we read: “Sun Tzu had his feet cut off and yet
continued to discuss the art of war.” [3] It seems likely, then, that “Pin” was
a nickname bestowed on him after his mutilation, unless the story was invented
in order to account for the name. The crowning incident of his career, the
crushing defeat of his treacherous rival P’ang Chuan, will be found
briefly related in Chapter V. § 19, note.

To return to the elder Sun Tzu. He is mentioned in two other passages of the
Shih Chi:—

In the third year of his reign [512 B.C.] Ho Lu, king of Wu, took the field
with Tzu-hsu [i.e. Wu Yuan] and Po P’ei, and attacked Ch’u. He
captured the town of Shu and slew the two prince’s sons who had formerly been
generals of Wu. He was then meditating a descent on Ying [the capital]; but the
general Sun Wu said: “The army is exhausted. It is not yet possible. We must
wait”…. [After further successful fighting,] “in the ninth year [506 B.C.],
King Ho Lu addressed Wu Tzu-hsu and Sun Wu, saying: “Formerly, you declared
that it was not yet possible for us to enter Ying. Is the time ripe now?” The
two men replied: “Ch’u’s general Tzu-ch’ang, [4] is grasping and
covetous, and the princes of T’ang and Ts’ai both have a grudge
against him. If Your Majesty has resolved to make a grand attack, you must win
over T’ang and Ts’ai, and then you may succeed.” Ho Lu followed
this advice, [beat Ch’u in five pitched battles and marched into Ying.] [5]

This is the latest date at which anything is recorded of Sun Wu. He does not
appear to have survived his patron, who died from the effects of a wound in
496. In another chapter there occurs this passage:[6]

From this time onward, a number of famous soldiers arose, one after the other:
Kao-fan, [7] who was employed by the Chin State; Wang-tzu, [8] in the service
of Ch’i; and Sun Wu, in the service of Wu. These men developed and threw
light upon the principles of war.

It is obvious enough that Ssu-ma Ch’ien at least had no doubt about the
reality of Sun Wu as an historical personage; and with one exception, to be
noticed presently, he is by far the most important authority on the period in
question. It will not be necessary, therefore, to say much of such a work as
the Wu Yueh Ch’un Ch’iu, which is supposed to have been
written by Chao Yeh of the 1st century A.D. The attribution is somewhat
doubtful; but even if it were otherwise, his account would be of little value,
based as it is on the Shih Chi and expanded with romantic details. The story of
Sun Tzu will be found, for what it is worth, in chapter 2. The only new points
in it worth noting are: (1) Sun Tzu was first recommended to Ho Lu by Wu
Tzu-hsu. (2) He is called a native of Wu. (3) He had previously lived a retired
life, and his contemporaries were unaware of his ability.

The following passage occurs in the Huai-nan Tzu: “When sovereign and ministers
show perversity of mind, it is impossible even for a Sun Tzu to encounter the
foe.” Assuming that this work is genuine (and hitherto no doubt has been cast
upon it), we have here the earliest direct reference for Sun Tzu, for Huai-nan
Tzu died in 122 B.C., many years before the Shih Chi was given to the world.

Liu Hsiang (80-9 B.C.) says: “The reason why Sun Tzu at the head of 30,000 men
beat Ch’u with 200,000 is that the latter were undisciplined.”

Teng Ming-shih informs us that the surname “Sun” was bestowed on Sun Wu’s
grandfather by Duke Ching of Ch’i [547-490 B.C.]. Sun Wu’s father Sun
P’ing, rose to be a Minister of State in Ch’i, and Sun Wu himself,
whose style was Ch’ang-ch’ing, fled to Wu on account of the
rebellion which was being fomented by the kindred of T’ien Pao. He had
three sons, of whom the second, named Ming, was the father of Sun Pin.
According to this account then, Pin was the grandson of Wu, which, considering
that Sun Pin’s victory over Wei was gained in 341 B.C., may be dismissed as
chronologically impossible. Whence these data were obtained by Teng Ming-shih I
do not know, but of course no reliance whatever can be placed in them.

An interesting document which has survived from the close of the Han period is
the short preface written by the Great Ts’ao Ts’ao, or Wei Wu Ti,
for his edition of Sun Tzu. I shall give it in full:—

I have heard that the ancients used bows and arrows to their advantage. [10] The Lun Yu says: “There must be a sufficiency of military
strength.” The Shu Ching mentions “the army” among the “eight
objects of government.” The I Ching says: “‘army’ indicates firmness and
justice; the experienced leader will have good fortune.” The Shih Ching
says: “The King rose majestic in his wrath, and he marshaled his troops.” The
Yellow Emperor, T’ang the Completer and Wu Wang all used spears and
battle-axes in order to succor their generation. The Ssu-ma Fa says: “If
one man slay another of set purpose, he himself may rightfully be slain.” He
who relies solely on warlike measures shall be exterminated; he who relies
solely on peaceful measures shall perish. Instances of this are Fu Ch’ai
[11] on the one hand and Yen Wang on the other. [12] In military matters, the
Sage’s rule is normally to keep the peace, and to move his forces only when
occasion requires. He will not use armed force unless driven to it by necessity.

Many books have I read on the subject of war and fighting; but the work
composed by Sun Wu is the profoundest of them all. [Sun Tzu was a native of the
Ch’i state, his personal name was Wu. He wrote the Art of War in
13 chapters for Ho Lu, King of Wu. Its principles were tested on women, and he
was subsequently made a general. He led an army westwards, crushed the
Ch’u state and entered Ying the capital. In the north, he kept Ch’i
and Chin in awe. A hundred years and more after his time, Sun Pin lived. He was
a descendant of Wu.] [13] In his treatment of deliberation and planning, the
importance of rapidity in taking the field, [14] clearness of conception, and
depth of design, Sun Tzu stands beyond the reach of carping criticism. My
contemporaries, however, have failed to grasp the full meaning of his
instructions, and while putting into practice the smaller details in which his
work abounds, they have overlooked its essential purport. That is the motive
which has led me to outline a rough explanation of the whole.

One thing to be noticed in the above is the explicit statement that the 13
chapters were specially composed for King Ho Lu. This is supported by the
internal evidence of I. § 15, in which it seems clear that some ruler is
addressed.

In the bibliographic section of the Han Shu, there is an entry which has given
rise to much discussion: “The works of Sun Tzu of Wu in 82 p’ien (or
chapters), with diagrams in 9 chuan.” It is evident that this cannot be merely
the 13 chapters known to Ssu-ma Ch’ien, or those we possess today. Chang
Shou-chieh refers to an edition of Sun Tzu’s Art of War of which the “13
chapters” formed the first chuan, adding that there were two other chuan
besides. This has brought forth a theory, that the bulk of these 82 chapters
consisted of other writings of Sun Tzu—we should call them
apocryphal—similar to the Wen Ta, of which a specimen dealing with the
Nine Situations [15] is preserved in the T’ung Tien, and another in Ho
Shin’s commentary. It is suggested that before his interview with Ho Lu, Sun
Tzu had only written the 13 chapters, but afterwards composed a sort of
exegesis in the form of question and answer between himself and the King. Pi
I-hsun, the author of the Sun Tzu Hsu Lu, backs this up with a quotation from
the Wu Yueh Ch’un Ch’iu: “The King of Wu summoned Sun Tzu, and
asked him questions about the art of war. Each time he set forth a chapter of
his work, the King could not find words enough to praise him.” As he points
out, if the whole work was expounded on the same scale as in the
above-mentioned fragments, the total number of chapters could not fail to be
considerable. Then the numerous other treatises attributed to Sun Tzu might be
included. The fact that the Han Chih mentions no work of Sun Tzu except the 82
p’ien, whereas the Sui and T’ang bibliographies give the titles of
others in addition to the “13 chapters,” is good proof, Pi I-hsun thinks, that
all of these were contained in the 82 p’ien. Without pinning our faith to
the accuracy of details supplied by the Wu Yueh Ch’un Ch’iu, or
admitting the genuineness of any of the treatises cited by Pi I-hsun, we may
see in this theory a probable solution of the mystery. Between Ssu-ma
Ch’ien and Pan Ku there was plenty of time for a luxuriant crop of
forgeries to have grown up under the magic name of Sun Tzu, and the 82
p’ien may very well represent a collected edition of these lumped
together with the original work. It is also possible, though less likely, that
some of them existed in the time of the earlier historian and were purposely
ignored by him. [16]

Tu Mu’s conjecture seems to be based on a passage which states: “Wei Wu Ti
strung together Sun Wu’s Art of War,” which in turn may have resulted from a
misunderstanding of the final words of Ts’ao King’s preface. This, as Sun
Hsing-yen points out, is only a modest way of saying that he made an
explanatory paraphrase, or in other words, wrote a commentary on it. On the
whole, this theory has met with very little acceptance. Thus, the Ssu K’u
Ch’uan Shu says: “The mention of the 13 chapters in the Shih Chi shows
that they were in existence before the Han Chih, and that latter accretions are
not to be considered part of the original work. Tu Mu’s assertion can certainly
not be taken as proof.”

There is every reason to suppose, then, that the 13 chapters existed in the
time of Ssu-ma Ch’ien practically as we have them now. That the work was
then well known he tells us in so many words. “Sun Tzu’s 13 Chapters and Wu
Ch’i’s Art of War are the two books that people commonly refer to on the
subject of military matters. Both of them are widely distributed, so I will not
discuss them here.” But as we go further back, serious difficulties begin to
arise. The salient fact which has to be faced is that the Tso Chuan, the
greatest contemporary record, makes no mention whatsoever of Sun Wu, either as
a general or as a writer. It is natural, in view of this awkward circumstance,
that many scholars should not only cast doubt on the story of Sun Wu as given
in the Shih Chi, but even show themselves frankly skeptical as to the existence
of the man at all. The most powerful presentment of this side of the case is to
be found in the following disposition by Yeh Shui-hsin: [17]—

It is stated in Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s history that Sun Wu was a native of the
Ch’i State, and employed by Wu; and that in the reign of Ho Lu he crushed
Ch’u, entered Ying, and was a great general. But in Tso’s Commentary no
Sun Wu appears at all. It is true that Tso’s Commentary need not contain
absolutely everything that other histories contain. But Tso has not omitted to
mention vulgar plebeians and hireling ruffians such as Ying K’ao-shu,
[18] Ts’ao Kuei, [19], Chu Chih-wu and Chuan She-chu [20]. In the case of
Sun Wu, whose fame and achievements were so brilliant, the omission is much
more glaring. Again, details are given, in their due order, about his
contemporaries Wu Yuan and the Minister P’ei. [21] Is it credible that
Sun Wu alone should have been passed over?

In point of literary style, Sun Tzu’s work belongs to the same school as Kuan
Tzu, [22] Liu T’ao, [23] and the Yueh Yu [24] and may have been the
production of some private scholar living towards the end of the “Spring and
Autumn” or the beginning of the “Warring States” period. [25] The story that
his precepts were actually applied by the Wu State, is merely the outcome of
big talk on the part of his followers.

From the flourishing period of the Chou dynasty [26] down to the time of the
“Spring and Autumn,” all military commanders were statesmen as well, and the
class of professional generals, for conducting external campaigns, did not then
exist. It was not until the period of the “Six States” [27] that this custom
changed. Now although Wu was an uncivilized State, it is conceivable that Tso
should have left unrecorded the fact that Sun Wu was a great general and yet
held no civil office? What we are told, therefore, about Jang-chu [28] and Sun
Wu, is not authentic matter, but the reckless fabrication of theorizing
pundits. The story of Ho Lu’s experiment on the women, in particular, is
utterly preposterous and incredible.

Yeh Shui-hsin represents Ssu-ma Ch’ien as having said that Sun Wu crushed
Ch’u and entered Ying. This is not quite correct. No doubt the impression
left on the reader’s mind is that he at least shared in these exploits. The
fact may or may not be significant; but it is nowhere explicitly stated in the
Shih Chi either that Sun Tzu was general on the occasion of the taking of Ying,
or that he even went there at all. Moreover, as we know that Wu Yuan and Po
P’ei both took part in the expedition, and also that its success was
largely due to the dash and enterprise of Fu Kai, Ho Lu’s younger brother, it
is not easy to see how yet another general could have played a very prominent
part in the same campaign.

Ch’en Chen-sun of the Sung dynasty has the note:—

Military writers look upon Sun Wu as the father of their art. But the fact that
he does not appear in the Tso Chuan, although he is said to have served under
Ho Lu King of Wu, makes it uncertain what period he really belonged to.

He also says:—

The works of Sun Wu and Wu Ch’i may be of genuine antiquity.

It is noticeable that both Yeh Shui-hsin and Ch’en Chen-sun, while
rejecting the personality of Sun Wu as he figures in Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s
history, are inclined to accept the date traditionally assigned to the work
which passes under his name. The author of the Hsu Lu fails to appreciate this
distinction, and consequently his bitter attack on Ch’en Chen-sun really
misses its mark. He makes one of two points, however, which certainly tell in
favor of the high antiquity of our “13 chapters.” “Sun Tzu,” he says, “must
have lived in the age of Ching Wang [519-476], because he is frequently
plagiarized in subsequent works of the Chou, Ch’in and Han dynasties.”
The two most shameless offenders in this respect are Wu Ch’i and Huai-nan
Tzu, both of them important historical personages in their day. The former
lived only a century after the alleged date of Sun Tzu, and his death is known
to have taken place in 381 B.C. It was to him, according to Liu Hsiang, that
Tseng Shen delivered the Tso Chuan, which had been entrusted to him by its
author. [29] Now the fact that quotations from the Art of War,
acknowledged or otherwise, are to be found in so many authors of different
epochs, establishes a very strong anterior to them all,—in other words,
that Sun Tzu’s treatise was already in existence towards the end of the 5th
century B.C. Further proof of Sun Tzu’s antiquity is furnished by the archaic
or wholly obsolete meanings attaching to a number of the words he uses. A list
of these, which might perhaps be extended, is given in the Hsu Lu; and though
some of the interpretations are doubtful, the main argument is hardly affected
thereby. Again, it must not be forgotten that Yeh Shui-hsin, a scholar and
critic of the first rank, deliberately pronounces the style of the 13 chapters
to belong to the early part of the fifth century. Seeing that he is actually
engaged in an attempt to disprove the existence of Sun Wu himself, we may be
sure that he would not have hesitated to assign the work to a later date had he
not honestly believed the contrary. And it is precisely on such a point that
the judgment of an educated Chinaman will carry most weight. Other internal
evidence is not far to seek. Thus in XIII. § 1, there is an unmistakable
allusion to the ancient system of land-tenure which had already passed away by
the time of Mencius, who was anxious to see it revived in a modified form. [30] The only warfare Sun Tzu knows is that carried on between the various feudal
princes, in which armored chariots play a large part. Their use seems to have
entirely died out before the end of the Chou dynasty. He speaks as a man of Wu,
a state which ceased to exist as early as 473 B.C. On this I shall touch
presently.

But once refer the work to the 5th century or earlier, and the chances of its
being other than a bonâ fide production are sensibly diminished. The
great age of forgeries did not come until long after. That it should have been
forged in the period immediately following 473 is particularly unlikely, for no
one, as a rule, hastens to identify himself with a lost cause. As for Yeh
Shui-hsin’s theory, that the author was a literary recluse, that seems to me
quite untenable. If one thing is more apparent than another after reading the
maxims of Sun Tzu, it is that their essence has been distilled from a large
store of personal observation and experience. They reflect the mind not only of
a born strategist, gifted with a rare faculty of generalization, but also of a
practical soldier closely acquainted with the military conditions of his time.
To say nothing of the fact that these sayings have been accepted and endorsed
by all the greatest captains of Chinese history, they offer a combination of
freshness and sincerity, acuteness and common sense, which quite excludes the
idea that they were artificially concocted in the study. If we admit, then,
that the 13 chapters were the genuine production of a military man living
towards the end of the “Ch’un Ch’iu” period, are we not bound, in
spite of the silence of the Tso Chuan, to accept Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s account
in its entirety? In view of his high repute as a sober historian, must we not
hesitate to assume that the records he drew upon for Sun Wu’s biography were
false and untrustworthy? The answer, I fear, must be in the negative. There is
still one grave, if not fatal, objection to the chronology involved in the
story as told in the Shih Chi, which, so far as I am aware, nobody has yet
pointed out. There are two passages in Sun Tzu in which he alludes to
contemporary affairs. The first in in VI. § 21:—

Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh exceed our own in number,
that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then that
victory can be achieved.

The other is in XI. § 30:—

Asked if an army can be made to imitate the shuai-jan, I should answer,
Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yueh are enemies; yet if they are
crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will come to
each other’s assistance just as the left hand helps the right.

These two paragraphs are extremely valuable as evidence of the date of
composition. They assign the work to the period of the struggle between Wu and
Yueh. So much has been observed by Pi I-hsun. But what has hitherto escaped
notice is that they also seriously impair the credibility of Ssu-ma
Ch’ien’s narrative. As we have seen above, the first positive date given
in connection with Sun Wu is 512 B.C. He is then spoken of as a general, acting
as confidential adviser to Ho Lu, so that his alleged introduction to that
monarch had already taken place, and of course the 13 chapters must have been
written earlier still. But at that time, and for several years after, down to
the capture of Ying in 506, Ch’u and not Yueh, was the great hereditary
enemy of Wu. The two states, Ch’u and Wu, had been constantly at war for
over half a century, [31] whereas the first war between Wu and Yueh was waged
only in 510, [32] and even then was no more than a short interlude sandwiched
in the midst of the fierce struggle with Ch’u. Now Ch’u is not
mentioned in the 13 chapters at all. The natural inference is that they were
written at a time when Yueh had become the prime antagonist of Wu, that is,
after Ch’u had suffered the great humiliation of 506. At this point, a
table of dates may be found useful.

The sentence quoted above from VI. § 21 hardly strikes me as one that could have been written in the full flush of victory. It seems rather to imply that, for the moment at least, the tide had turned against Wu, and that she was getting the worst of the struggle. Hence we may conclude that our treatise was not in existence in 505, before which date Yueh does not appear to have scored any notable success against Wu. Ho Lu died in 496, so that if the book was written for him, it must have been during the period 505-496, when there was a lull in the hostilities, Wu having presumably exhausted by its supreme effort against Ch’u. On the other hand, if we choose to disregard the tradition connecting Sun Wu’s name with Ho Lu, it might equally well have seen the light between 496 and 494, or possibly in the period 482-473, when Yueh was once again becoming a very serious menace. [33] We may feel fairly certain that the author, whoever he may have been, was not a man of any great eminence in his own day. On this point the negative testimony of the Tso Chuan far outweighs any shred of authority still attaching to the Shih Chi, if once its other facts are discredited. Sun Hsing-yen, however, makes a feeble attempt to explain the omission of his name from the great commentary. It was Wu Tzu-hsu, he says, who got all the credit of Sun Wu’s exploits, because the latter (being an alien) was not rewarded with an office in the State.

How then did the Sun Tzu legend originate? It may be that the growing celebrity
of the book imparted by degrees a kind of factitious renown to its author. It
was felt to be only right and proper that one so well versed in the science of
war should have solid achievements to his credit as well. Now the capture of
Ying was undoubtedly the greatest feat of arms in Ho Lu’s reign; it made a deep
and lasting impression on all the surrounding states, and raised Wu to the
short-lived zenith of her power. Hence, what more natural, as time went on,
than that the acknowledged master of strategy, Sun Wu, should be popularly
identified with that campaign, at first perhaps only in the sense that his
brain conceived and planned it; afterwards, that it was actually carried out by
him in conjunction with Wu Yuan, [34] Po P’ei and Fu Kai?

It is obvious that any attempt to reconstruct even the outline of Sun Tzu’s
life must be based almost wholly on conjecture. With this necessary proviso, I
should say that he probably entered the service of Wu about the time of Ho Lu’s
accession, and gathered experience, though only in the capacity of a
subordinate officer, during the intense military activity which marked the
first half of the prince’s reign. [35] If he rose to be a general at all, he
certainly was never on an equal footing with the three above mentioned. He was
doubtless present at the investment and occupation of Ying, and witnessed Wu’s
sudden collapse in the following year. Yueh’s attack at this critical juncture,
when her rival was embarrassed on every side, seems to have convinced him that
this upstart kingdom was the great enemy against whom every effort would
henceforth have to be directed. Sun Wu was thus a well-seasoned warrior when he
sat down to write his famous book, which according to my reckoning must have
appeared towards the end, rather than the beginning of Ho Lu’s reign. The story
of the women may possibly have grown out of some real incident occurring about
the same time. As we hear no more of Sun Wu after this from any source, he is
hardly likely to have survived his patron or to have taken part in the
death-struggle with Yueh, which began with the disaster at Tsui-li.

If these inferences are approximately correct, there is a certain irony in the
fate which decreed that China’s most illustrious man of peace should be
contemporary with her greatest writer on war.

The Text of Sun Tzu

I have found it difficult to glean much about the history of Sun Tzu’s text.
The quotations that occur in early authors go to show that the “13 chapters” of
which Ssu-ma Ch’ien speaks were essentially the same as those now extant.
We have his word for it that they were widely circulated in his day, and can
only regret that he refrained from discussing them on that account. Sun
Hsing-yen says in his preface:—

During the Ch’in and Han dynasties Sun Tzu’s Art of War was in
general use amongst military commanders, but they seem to have treated it as a
work of mysterious import, and were unwilling to expound it for the benefit of
posterity. Thus it came about that Wei Wu was the first to write a commentary
on it.

As we have already seen, there is no reasonable ground to suppose that
Ts’ao Kung tampered with the text. But the text itself is often so
obscure, and the number of editions which appeared from that time onward so
great, especially during the T’ang and Sung dynasties, that it would be
surprising if numerous corruptions had not managed to creep in. Towards the
middle of the Sung period, by which time all the chief commentaries on Sun Tzu
were in existence, a certain Chi T’ien-pao published a work in 15
chuan entitled “Sun Tzu with the collected commentaries of ten writers.”
There was another text, with variant readings put forward by Chu Fu of
Ta-hsing, which also had supporters among the scholars of that period; but in
the Ming editions, Sun Hsing-yen tells us, these readings were for some reason
or other no longer put into circulation. Thus, until the end of the 18th
century, the text in sole possession of the field was one derived from Chi
T’ien-pao’s edition, although no actual copy of that important work was
known to have survived. That, therefore, is the text of Sun Tzu which appears
in the War section of the great Imperial encyclopedia printed in 1726, the
Ku Chin T’u Shu Chi Ch’eng. Another copy at my disposal of
what is practically the same text, with slight variations, is that contained in
the “Eleven philosophers of the Chou and Ch’in dynasties” [1758]. And the
Chinese printed in Capt. Calthrop’s first edition is evidently a similar
version which has filtered through Japanese channels. So things remained until
Sun Hsing-yen [1752-1818], a distinguished antiquarian and classical scholar,
who claimed to be an actual descendant of Sun Wu, [36] accidentally discovered
a copy of Chi T’ien-pao’s long-lost work, when on a visit to the library
of the Hua-yin temple. [37] Appended to it was the I Shuo of Cheng
Yu-Hsien, mentioned in the T’ung Chih, and also believed to have
perished. This is what Sun Hsing-yen designates as the “original edition (or
text)”—a rather misleading name, for it cannot by any means claim to set
before us the text of Sun Tzu in its pristine purity. Chi T’ien-pao was a
careless compiler, and appears to have been content to reproduce the somewhat
debased version current in his day, without troubling to collate it with the
earliest editions then available. Fortunately, two versions of Sun Tzu, even
older than the newly discovered work, were still extant, one buried in the
T’ung Tien, Tu Yu’s great treatise on the Constitution, the other
similarly enshrined in the T’ai P’ing Yu Lan encyclopedia.
In both the complete text is to be found, though split up into fragments,
intermixed with other matter, and scattered piecemeal over a number of
different sections. Considering that the Yu Lan takes us back to the
year 983, and the T’ung Tien about 200 years further still, to the
middle of the T’ang dynasty, the value of these early transcripts of Sun
Tzu can hardly be overestimated. Yet the idea of utilizing them does not seem
to have occurred to anyone until Sun Hsing-yen, acting under Government
instructions, undertook a thorough recension of the text. This is his own
account:—

Because of the numerous mistakes in the text of Sun Tzu which his editors had
handed down, the Government ordered that the ancient edition [of Chi
T’ien-pao] should be used, and that the text should be revised and
corrected throughout. It happened that Wu Nien-hu, the Governor Pi Kua, and
Hsi, a graduate of the second degree, had all devoted themselves to this study,
probably surpassing me therein. Accordingly, I have had the whole work cut on
blocks as a textbook for military men.

The three individuals here referred to had evidently been occupied on the text
of Sun Tzu prior to Sun Hsing-yen’s commission, but we are left in doubt as to
the work they really accomplished. At any rate, the new edition, when
ultimately produced, appeared in the names of Sun Hsing-yen and only one
co-editor Wu Jen-shi. They took the “original edition” as their basis, and by
careful comparison with older versions, as well as the extant commentaries and
other sources of information such as the I Shuo, succeeded in restoring a very
large number of doubtful passages, and turned out, on the whole, what must be
accepted as the closest approximation we are ever likely to get to Sun Tzu’s
original work. This is what will hereafter be denominated the “standard text.”

The copy which I have used belongs to a reissue dated 1877. It is in 6 pen,
forming part of a well-printed set of 23 early philosophical works in 83 pen.
[38] It opens with a preface by Sun Hsing-yen (largely quoted in this
introduction), vindicating the traditional view of Sun Tzu’s life and
performances, and summing up in remarkably concise fashion the evidence in its
favor. This is followed by Ts’ao Kung’s preface to his edition, and the
biography of Sun Tzu from the Shih Chi, both translated above. Then come,
firstly, Cheng Yu-hsien’s I Shuo, [39] with author’s preface, and next, a short
miscellany of historical and bibliographical information entitled Sun Tzu Hsu
Lu, compiled by Pi I-hsun. As regards the body of the work, each separate
sentence is followed by a note on the text, if required, and then by the
various commentaries appertaining to it, arranged in chronological order. These
we shall now proceed to discuss briefly, one by one.

The Commentators

Sun Tzu can boast an exceptionally long distinguished roll of commentators,
which would do honor to any classic. Ou-yang Hsiu remarks on this fact, though
he wrote before the tale was complete, and rather ingeniously explains it by
saying that the artifices of war, being inexhaustible, must therefore be
susceptible of treatment in a great variety of ways.

1. TS’AO TS’AO or Ts’ao Kung, afterwards known as Wei Wu Ti
[A.D. 155-220]. There is hardly any room for doubt that the earliest commentary
on Sun Tzu actually came from the pen of this extraordinary man, whose
biography in the San Kuo Chih reads like a romance. One of the greatest
military geniuses that the world has seen, and Napoleonic in the scale of his
operations, he was especially famed for the marvelous rapidity of his marches,
which has found expression in the line “Talk of Ts’ao Ts’ao, and
Ts’ao Ts’ao will appear.” Ou-yang Hsiu says of him that he was a
great captain who “measured his strength against Tung Cho, Lu Pu and the two
Yuan, father and son, and vanquished them all; whereupon he divided the Empire
of Han with Wu and Shu, and made himself king. It is recorded that whenever a
council of war was held by Wei on the eve of a far-reaching campaign, he had
all his calculations ready; those generals who made use of them did not lose
one battle in ten; those who ran counter to them in any particular saw their
armies incontinently beaten and put to flight.” Ts’ao Kung’s notes on Sun
Tzu, models of austere brevity, are so thoroughly characteristic of the stern
commander known to history, that it is hard indeed to conceive of them as the
work of a mere littérateur. Sometimes, indeed, owing to extreme compression,
they are scarcely intelligible and stand no less in need of a commentary than
the text itself. [40]

2. MENG SHIH. The commentary which has come down to us under this name is
comparatively meager, and nothing about the author is known. Even his personal
name has not been recorded. Chi T’ien-pao’s edition places him after Chia
Lin, and Ch’ao Kung-wu also assigns him to the T’ang dynasty, [41] but this is a mistake. In Sun Hsing-yen’s preface, he appears as Meng Shih of
the Liang dynasty [502-557]. Others would identify him with Meng K’ang of
the 3rd century. He is named in one work as the last of the “Five
Commentators,” the others being Wei Wu Ti, Tu Mu, Ch’en Hao and Chia Lin.

3. LI CH’UAN of the 8th century was a well-known writer on military
tactics. One of his works has been in constant use down to the present day. The
T’ung Chih mentions “Lives of famous generals from the Chou to the
T’ang dynasty” as written by him. [42] According to Ch’ao Kung-wu
and the T’ien-i-ko catalogue, he followed a variant of the text of Sun
Tzu which differs considerably from those now extant. His notes are mostly
short and to the point, and he frequently illustrates his remarks by anecdotes
from Chinese history.

4. TU YU (died 812) did not publish a separate commentary on Sun Tzu, his notes
being taken from the T’ung Tien, the encyclopedic treatise on the
Constitution which was his life-work. They are largely repetitions of
Ts’ao Kung and Meng Shih, besides which it is believed that he drew on
the ancient commentaries of Wang Ling and others. Owing to the peculiar
arrangement of T’ung Tien, he has to explain each passage on its merits,
apart from the context, and sometimes his own explanation does not agree with
that of Ts’ao Kung, whom he always quotes first. Though not strictly to
be reckoned as one of the “Ten Commentators,” he was added to their number by
Chi T’ien-pao, being wrongly placed after his grandson Tu Mu.

5. TU MU (803-852) is perhaps the best known as a poet—a bright star even
in the glorious galaxy of the T’ang period. We learn from Ch’ao
Kung-wu that although he had no practical experience of war, he was extremely
fond of discussing the subject, and was moreover well read in the military
history of the Ch’un Ch’iu and Chan Kuo eras. His notes, therefore,
are well worth attention. They are very copious, and replete with historical
parallels. The gist of Sun Tzu’s work is thus summarized by him: “Practice
benevolence and justice, but on the other hand make full use of artifice and
measures of expediency.” He further declared that all the military triumphs and
disasters of the thousand years which had elapsed since Sun Tzu’s death would,
upon examination, be found to uphold and corroborate, in every particular, the
maxims contained in his book. Tu Mu’s somewhat spiteful charge against
Ts’ao Kung has already been considered elsewhere.

6. CH’EN HAO appears to have been a contemporary of Tu Mu. Ch’ao
Kung-wu says that he was impelled to write a new commentary on Sun Tzu because
Ts’ao Kung’s on the one hand was too obscure and subtle, and that of Tu
Mu on the other too long-winded and diffuse. Ou-yang Hsiu, writing in the
middle of the 11th century, calls Ts’ao Kung, Tu Mu and Ch’en Hao
the three chief commentators on Sun Tzu, and observes that Ch’en Hao is
continually attacking Tu Mu’s shortcomings. His commentary, though not lacking
in merit, must rank below those of his predecessors.

7. CHIA LIN is known to have lived under the T’ang dynasty, for his
commentary on Sun Tzu is mentioned in the T’ang Shu and was afterwards
republished by Chi Hsieh of the same dynasty together with those of Meng Shih
and Tu Yu. It is of somewhat scanty texture, and in point of quality, too,
perhaps the least valuable of the eleven.

8. MEI YAO-CH’EN (1002-1060), commonly known by his “style” as Mei
Sheng-yu, was, like Tu Mu, a poet of distinction. His commentary was published
with a laudatory preface by the great Ou-yang Hsiu, from which we may cull the
following:—

Later scholars have misread Sun Tzu, distorting his words and trying to make
them square with their own one-sided views. Thus, though commentators have not
been lacking, only a few have proved equal to the task. My friend Sheng-yu has
not fallen into this mistake. In attempting to provide a critical commentary
for Sun Tzu’s work, he does not lose sight of the fact that these sayings were
intended for states engaged in internecine warfare; that the author is not
concerned with the military conditions prevailing under the sovereigns of the
three ancient dynasties, [43] nor with the nine punitive measures prescribed to
the Minister of War. [44] Again, Sun Wu loved brevity of diction, but his
meaning is always deep. Whether the subject be marching an army, or handling
soldiers, or estimating the enemy, or controlling the forces of victory, it is
always systematically treated; the sayings are bound together in strict logical
sequence, though this has been obscured by commentators who have probably
failed to grasp their meaning. In his own commentary, Mei Sheng-yu has brushed
aside all the obstinate prejudices of these critics, and has tried to bring out
the true meaning of Sun Tzu himself. In this way, the clouds of confusion have
been dispersed and the sayings made clear. I am convinced that the present work
deserves to be handed down side by side with the three great commentaries; and
for a great deal that they find in the sayings, coming generations will have
constant reason to thank my friend Sheng-yu.

Making some allowance for the exuberance of friendship, I am inclined to
endorse this favorable judgment, and would certainly place him above
Ch’en Hao in order of merit.

9. WANG HSI, also of the Sung dynasty, is decidedly original in some of his
interpretations, but much less judicious than Mei Yao-ch’en, and on the
whole not a very trustworthy guide. He is fond of comparing his own commentary
with that of Ts’ao Kung, but the comparison is not often flattering to
him. We learn from Ch’ao Kung-wu that Wang Hsi revised the ancient text
of Sun Tzu, filling up lacunae and correcting mistakes. [45]

10. HO YEN-HSI of the Sung dynasty. The personal name of this commentator is
given as above by Cheng Ch’iao in the Tung Chih, written about the middle
of the twelfth century, but he appears simply as Ho Shih in the Yu Hai, and Ma
Tuan-lin quotes Ch’ao Kung-wu as saying that his personal name is
unknown. There seems to be no reason to doubt Cheng Ch’iao’s statement,
otherwise I should have been inclined to hazard a guess and identify him with
one Ho Ch’u-fei, the author of a short treatise on war, who lived in the
latter part of the 11th century. Ho Shih’s commentary, in the words of the
T’ien-i-ko catalogue, “contains helpful additions” here and there, but is
chiefly remarkable for the copious extracts taken, in adapted form, from the
dynastic histories and other sources.

11. CHANG YU. The list closes with a commentator of no great originality
perhaps, but gifted with admirable powers of lucid exposition. His commentator
is based on that of Ts’ao Kung, whose terse sentences he contrives to
expand and develop in masterly fashion. Without Chang Yu, it is safe to say
that much of Ts’ao Kung’s commentary would have remained cloaked in its
pristine obscurity and therefore valueless. His work is not mentioned in the
Sung history, the T’ung K’ao, or the Yu Hai, but it finds a niche
in the T’ung Chih, which also names him as the author of the “Lives of
Famous Generals.” [46]

It is rather remarkable that the last-named four should all have flourished
within so short a space of time. Ch’ao Kung-wu accounts for it by saying:
“During the early years of the Sung dynasty the Empire enjoyed a long spell of
peace, and men ceased to practice the art of war. but when [Chao] Yuan-hao’s
rebellion came [1038-42] and the frontier generals were defeated time after
time, the Court made strenuous inquiry for men skilled in war, and military
topics became the vogue amongst all the high officials. Hence it is that the
commentators of Sun Tzu in our dynasty belong mainly to that period. [47]

Besides these eleven commentators, there are several others whose work has not
come down to us. The Sui Shu mentions four, namely Wang Ling (often quoted by
Tu Yu as Wang Tzu); Chang Tzu-shang; Chia Hsu of Wei; [48] and Shen Yu of Wu.
The T’ang Shu adds Sun Hao, and the T’ung Chih Hsiao Chi, while the
T’u Shu mentions a Ming commentator, Huang Jun-yu. It is possible that
some of these may have been merely collectors and editors of other
commentaries, like Chi T’ien-pao and Chi Hsieh, mentioned above.

Appreciations of Sun Tzu

Sun Tzu has exercised a potent fascination over the minds of some of China’s
greatest men. Among the famous generals who are known to have studied his pages
with enthusiasm may be mentioned Han Hsin (d. 196 B.C.), [49] Feng I (d. 34
A.D.), [50] Lu Meng (d. 219), [51] and Yo Fei (1103-1141). [52] The opinion of
Ts’ao Kung, who disputes with Han Hsin the highest place in Chinese
military annals, has already been recorded. [53] Still more remarkable, in one
way, is the testimony of purely literary men, such as Su Hsun (the father of Su
Tung-p’o), who wrote several essays on military topics, all of which owe
their chief inspiration to Sun Tzu. The following short passage by him is
preserved in the Yu Hai: [54]—

Sun Wu’s saying, that in war one cannot make certain of conquering, [55] is
very different indeed from what other books tell us. [56] Wu Ch’i was a
man of the same stamp as Sun Wu: they both wrote books on war, and they are
linked together in popular speech as “Sun and Wu.” But Wu Ch’i’s remarks
on war are less weighty, his rules are rougher and more crudely stated, and
there is not the same unity of plan as in Sun Tzu’s work, where the style is
terse, but the meaning fully brought out.

The following is an extract from the “Impartial Judgments in the Garden of
Literature” by Cheng Hou:—

Sun Tzu’s 13 chapters are not only the staple and base of all military men’s
training, but also compel the most careful attention of scholars and men of
letters. His sayings are terse yet elegant, simple yet profound, perspicuous
and eminently practical. Such works as the Lun Yu, the I Ching
and the great Commentary, [57] as well as the writings of Mencius, Hsun
K’uang and Yang Chu, all fall below the level of Sun Tzu.

Chu Hsi, commenting on this, fully admits the first part of the criticism,
although he dislikes the audacious comparison with the venerated classical
works. Language of this sort, he says, “encourages a ruler’s bent towards
unrelenting warfare and reckless militarism.”

Apologies for War

Accustomed as we are to think of China as the greatest peace-loving nation on
earth, we are in some danger of forgetting that her experience of war in all
its phases has also been such as no modern State can parallel. Her long
military annals stretch back to a point at which they are lost in the mists of
time. She had built the Great Wall and was maintaining a huge standing army
along her frontier centuries before the first Roman legionary was seen on the
Danube. What with the perpetual collisions of the ancient feudal States, the
grim conflicts with Huns, Turks and other invaders after the centralization of
government, the terrific upheavals which accompanied the overthrow of so many
dynasties, besides the countless rebellions and minor disturbances that have
flamed up and flickered out again one by one, it is hardly too much to say that
the clash of arms has never ceased to resound in one portion or another of the
Empire.

No less remarkable is the succession of illustrious captains to whom China can
point with pride. As in all countries, the greatest are fond of emerging at the
most fateful crises of her history. Thus, Po Ch’i stands out conspicuous
in the period when Ch’in was entering upon her final struggle with the
remaining independent states. The stormy years which followed the break-up of
the Ch’in dynasty are illuminated by the transcendent genius of Han Hsin.
When the House of Han in turn is tottering to its fall, the great and baleful
figure of Ts’ao Ts’ao dominates the scene. And in the establishment
of the T’ang dynasty, one of the mightiest tasks achieved by man, the
superhuman energy of Li Shih-min (afterwards the Emperor T’ai Tsung) was
seconded by the brilliant strategy of Li Ching. None of these generals need
fear comparison with the greatest names in the military history of Europe.

In spite of all this, the great body of Chinese sentiment, from Lao Tzu
downwards, and especially as reflected in the standard literature of
Confucianism, has been consistently pacific and intensely opposed to militarism
in any form. It is such an uncommon thing to find any of the literati defending
warfare on principle, that I have thought it worth while to collect and
translate a few passages in which the unorthodox view is upheld. The following,
by Ssu-ma Ch’ien, shows that for all his ardent admiration of Confucius,
he was yet no advocate of peace at any price:—

Military weapons are the means used by the Sage to punish violence and cruelty,
to give peace to troublous times, to remove difficulties and dangers, and to
succor those who are in peril. Every animal with blood in its veins and horns
on its head will fight when it is attacked. How much more so will man, who
carries in his breast the faculties of love and hatred, joy and anger! When he
is pleased, a feeling of affection springs up within him; when angry, his
poisoned sting is brought into play. That is the natural law which governs his
being…. What then shall be said of those scholars of our time, blind to all
great issues, and without any appreciation of relative values, who can only
bark out their stale formulas about “virtue” and “civilization,” condemning the
use of military weapons? They will surely bring our country to impotence and
dishonor and the loss of her rightful heritage; or, at the very least, they
will bring about invasion and rebellion, sacrifice of territory and general
enfeeblement. Yet they obstinately refuse to modify the position they have
taken up. The truth is that, just as in the family the teacher must not spare
the rod, and punishments cannot be dispensed with in the State, so military
chastisement can never be allowed to fall into abeyance in the Empire. All one
can say is that this power will be exercised wisely by some, foolishly by
others, and that among those who bear arms some will be loyal and others
rebellious. [58]

The next piece is taken from Tu Mu’s preface to his commentary on Sun
Tzu:—

War may be defined as punishment, which is one of the functions of government.
It was the profession of Chung Yu and Jan Ch’iu, both disciples of
Confucius. Nowadays, the holding of trials and hearing of litigation, the
imprisonment of offenders and their execution by flogging in the market-place,
are all done by officials. But the wielding of huge armies, the throwing down
of fortified cities, the hauling of women and children into captivity, and the
beheading of traitors—this is also work which is done by officials. The
objects of the rack and of military weapons are essentially the same. There is
no intrinsic difference between the punishment of flogging and cutting off
heads in war. For the lesser infractions of law, which are easily dealt with,
only a small amount of force need be employed: hence the use of military
weapons and wholesale decapitation. In both cases, however, the end in view is
to get rid of wicked people, and to give comfort and relief to the good….

Chi-sun asked Jan Yu, saying: “Have you, Sir, acquired your military aptitude
by study, or is it innate?” Jan Yu replied: “It has been acquired by study.”
[59] “How can that be so,” said Chi-sun, “seeing that you are a disciple of
Confucius?” “It is a fact,” replied Jan Yu; “I was taught by Confucius. It is
fitting that the great Sage should exercise both civil and military functions,
though to be sure my instruction in the art of fighting has not yet gone very
far.”

Now, who the author was of this rigid distinction between the “civil” and the
“military,” and the limitation of each to a separate sphere of action, or in
what year of which dynasty it was first introduced, is more than I can say.
But, at any rate, it has come about that the members of the governing class are
quite afraid of enlarging on military topics, or do so only in a shamefaced
manner. If any are bold enough to discuss the subject, they are at once set
down as eccentric individuals of coarse and brutal propensities. This is an
extraordinary instance in which, through sheer lack of reasoning, men unhappily
lose sight of fundamental principles.

When the Duke of Chou was minister under Ch’eng Wang, he regulated
ceremonies and made music, and venerated the arts of scholarship and learning;
yet when the barbarians of the River Huai revolted, [60] he sallied forth and
chastised them. When Confucius held office under the Duke of Lu, and a meeting
was convened at Chia-ku, [61] he said: “If pacific negotiations are in
progress, warlike preparations should have been made beforehand.” He rebuked
and shamed the Marquis of Ch’i, who cowered under him and dared not
proceed to violence. How can it be said that these two great Sages had no
knowledge of military matters?

We have seen that the great Chu Hsi held Sun Tzu in high esteem. He also
appeals to the authority of the Classics:—

Our Master Confucius, answering Duke Ling of Wei, said: “I have never studied
matters connected with armies and battalions.” [62] Replying to K’ung
Wen-tzu, he said: I have not been instructed about buff-coats and weapons.” But
if we turn to the meeting at Chia-ku, we find that he used armed force against
the men of Lai, so that the marquis of Ch’i was overawed. Again, when the
inhabitants of Pi revolted; he ordered his officers to attack them, whereupon
they were defeated and fled in confusion. He once uttered the words: “If I
fight, I conquer.” [63] And Jan Yu also said: “The Sage exercises both civil
and military functions.” [64] Can it be a fact that Confucius never studied or
received instruction in the art of war? We can only say that he did not
specially choose matters connected with armies and fighting to be the subject
of his teaching.

Sun Hsing-yen, the editor of Sun Tzu, writes in similar strain:—

Confucius said: “I am unversed in military matters.” [65] He also said: “If I
fight, I conquer.” Confucius ordered ceremonies and regulated music. Now war
constitutes one of the five classes of State ceremonial, [66] and must not be
treated as an independent branch of study. Hence, the words “I am unversed in”
must be taken to mean that there are things which even an inspired Teacher does
not know. Those who have to lead an army and devise stratagems, must learn the
art of war. But if one can command the services of a good general like Sun Tzu,
who was employed by Wu Tzu-hsu, there is no need to learn it oneself. Hence the
remark added by Confucius: “If I fight, I conquer.”

The men of the present day, however, willfully interpret these words of
Confucius in their narrowest sense, as though he meant that books on the art of
war were not worth reading. With blind persistency, they adduce the example of
Chao Kua, who pored over his father’s books to no purpose, [67] as a proof that
all military theory is useless. Again, seeing that books on war have to do with
such things as opportunism in designing plans, and the conversion of spies,
they hold that the art is immoral and unworthy of a sage. These people ignore
the fact that the studies of our scholars and the civil administration of our
officials also require steady application and practice before efficiency is
reached. The ancients were particularly chary of allowing mere novices to botch
their work. [68] Weapons are baneful [69] and fighting perilous; and useless
unless a general is in constant practice, he ought not to hazard other men’s
lives in battle. [70] Hence it is essential that Sun Tzu’s 13 chapters should
be studied.

Hsiang Liang used to instruct his nephew Chi [71] in the art of war. Chi got a
rough idea of the art in its general bearings, but would not pursue his studies
to their proper outcome, the consequence being that he was finally defeated and
overthrown. He did not realize that the tricks and artifices of war are beyond
verbal computation. Duke Hsiang of Sung and King Yen of Hsu were brought to
destruction by their misplaced humanity. The treacherous and underhand nature
of war necessitates the use of guile and stratagem suited to the occasion.
There is a case on record of Confucius himself having violated an extorted
oath, [72] and also of his having left the Sung State in disguise. [73] Can we
then recklessly arraign Sun Tzu for disregarding truth and honesty?

Bibliography

The following are the oldest Chinese treatises on war, after Sun Tzu. The notes
on each have been drawn principally from the Ssu k’u ch’uan shu
chien ming mu lu, ch. 9, fol. 22 sqq.

1. Wu Tzu, in 1 chuan or 6 chapters. By Wu Ch’i (d. 381 B.C.). A genuine
work. See Shih Chi, ch. 65.

2. Ssu-ma Fa, in 1 chuan or 5 chapters. Wrongly attributed to Ssu-ma Jang-chu
of the 6th century B.C. Its date, however, must be early, as the customs of the
three ancient dynasties are constantly to be met within its pages. See Shih
Chi, ch. 64.

The Ssu K’u Ch’uan Shu (ch. 99, f. 1) remarks that the oldest three
treatises on war, Sun Tzu, Wu Tzu and Ssu-ma Fa, are, generally speaking, only
concerned with things strictly military—the art of producing, collecting,
training and drilling troops, and the correct theory with regard to measures of
expediency, laying plans, transport of goods and the handling of
soldiers—in strong contrast to later works, in which the science of war
is usually blended with metaphysics, divination and magical arts in general.

3. Liu T’ao, in 6 chuan, or 60 chapters. Attributed to Lu Wang (or Lu
Shang, also known as T’ai Kung) of the 12th century B.C. [74] But its
style does not belong to the era of the Three Dynasties. Lu Te-ming (550-625
A.D.) mentions the work, and enumerates the headings of the six sections so
that the forgery cannot have been later than Sui dynasty.

4. Wei Liao Tzu, in 5 chuan. Attributed to Wei Liao (4th cent. B.C.), who
studied under the famous Kuei-ku Tzu. The work appears to have been originally
in 31 chapters, whereas the text we possess contains only 24. Its matter is
sound enough in the main, though the strategical devices differ considerably
from those of the Warring States period. It is been furnished with a commentary
by the well-known Sung philosopher Chang Tsai.

5. San Lueh in 3 chuan. Attributed to Huang-shih Kung, a legendary personage
who is said to have bestowed it on Chang Liang (d. 187 B.C.) in an interview on
a bridge. But here again, the style is not that of works dating from the
Ch’in or Han period. The Han Emperor Kuang Wu [25-57 A.D.] apparently
quotes from it in one of his proclamations; but the passage in question may
have been inserted later on, in order to prove the genuineness of the work. We
shall not be far out if we refer it to the Northern Sung period [420-478 A.D.],
or somewhat earlier.

6. Li Wei Kung Wen Tui, in 3 sections. Written in the form of a dialogue
between T’ai Tsung and his great general Li Ching, it is usually ascribed
to the latter. Competent authorities consider it a forgery, though the author
was evidently well versed in the art of war.

7. Li Ching Ping Fa (not to be confounded with the foregoing) is a short
treatise in 8 chapters, preserved in the T’ung Tien, but not published
separately. This fact explains its omission from the Ssu K’u Ch’uan
Shu.

8. Wu Ch’i Ching, in 1 chuan. Attributed to the legendary minister Feng
Hou, with exegetical notes by Kung-sun Hung of the Han dynasty (d. 121 B.C.),
and said to have been eulogized by the celebrated general Ma Lung (d. 300
A.D.). Yet the earliest mention of it is in the Sung Chih. Although a forgery,
the work is well put together.

Considering the high popular estimation in which Chu-ko Liang has always been
held, it is not surprising to find more than one work on war ascribed to his
pen. Such are (1) the Shih Liu Ts’e (1 chuan), preserved in the Yung Lo
Ta Tien; (2) Chiang Yuan (1 chuan); and (3) Hsin Shu (1 chuan), which steals
wholesale from Sun Tzu. None of these has the slightest claim to be considered
genuine.

Most of the large Chinese encyclopedias contain extensive sections devoted to
the literature of war. The following references may be found useful:—

T’ung Tien (circa 800 A.D.), ch. 148-162.
T’ai P’ing Yu Lan (983), ch. 270-359.
Wen Hsien Tung K’ao (13th cent.), ch. 221.
Yu Hai (13th cent.), ch. 140, 141.
San Ts’ai T’u Hui (16th cent).
Kuang Po Wu Chih (1607), ch. 31, 32.
Ch’ien Ch’io Lei Shu (1632), ch. 75.
Yuan Chien Lei Han (1710), ch. 206-229.
Ku Chin T’u Shu Chi Ch’eng (1726), section XXX, esp. ch.
81-90.
Hsu Wen Hsien T’ung K’ao (1784), ch. 121-134.
Huang Ch’ao Ching Shih Wen Pien (1826), ch. 76, 77.

The bibliographical sections of certain historical works also deserve
mention:—

Ch’ien Han Shu, ch. 30.
Sui Shu, ch. 32-35.
Chiu T’ang Shu, ch. 46, 47.
Hsin T’ang Shu, ch. 57,60.
Sung Shih, ch. 202-209.
T’ung Chih (circa 1150), ch. 68.

To these of course must be added the great Catalogue of the Imperial
Library:—

Ssu K’u Ch’uan Shu Tsung Mu T’i Yao (1790), ch. 99, 100.

Footnotes

1. Shih Chi, ch. 65.

2. He reigned from 514 to 496 B.C.

3. Shih Chi, ch. 130.

4. The appellation of Nang Wa.

5. Shih Chi, ch. 31.

6. Shih Chi, ch. 25.

7. The appellation of Hu Yen, mentioned in ch. 39 under the year 637.

8. Wang-tzu Ch’eng-fu, ch. 32, year 607.

9. The mistake is natural enough. Native critics refer to a work of the Han
dynasty, which says: “Ten li outside the Wu gate [of the city of
Wu, now Soochow in Kiangsu] there is a great mound, raised to commemorate the
entertainment of Sun Wu of Ch’i, who excelled in the art of war, by the
King of Wu.”

10. “They attached strings to wood to make bows, and sharpened wood to make
arrows. The use of bows and arrows is to keep the Empire in awe.”

11. The son and successor of Ho Lu. He was finally defeated and overthrown by
Kou chien, King of Yueh, in 473 B.C. See post.

12. King Yen of Hsu, a fabulous being, of whom Sun Hsing-yen says in his
preface: “His humanity brought him to destruction.”

13. The passage I have put in brackets is omitted in the T’u Shu, and may
be an interpolation. It was known, however to Chang Shou-chieh of the
T’ang dynasty, and appears in the T’ai P’ing Yu Lan.

14. Ts’ao Kung seems to be thinking of the first part of chap. II,
perhaps especially of § 8.

15. See chap. XI.

16. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that Wu Tzu, which is not in 6
chapters, has 48 assigned to it in the Han Chih. Likewise, the Chung Yung is
credited with 49 chapters, though now only in one only. In the case of very
short works, one is tempted to think that p’ien might simply mean
“leaves.”

17. Yeh Shih of the Sung dynasty [1151-1223].

18. He hardly deserves to be bracketed with assassins.

19. See Chapter 7, § 27 and Chapter 11, § 28.

20. See Chapter 11, § 28. Chuan Chu is the abbreviated form of his name.

21. I.e. Po P’ei. See ante.

22. The nucleus of this work is probably genuine, though large additions have
been made by later hands. Kuan chung died in 645 B.C.

23. See infra, beginning of INTRODUCTION.

24. I do not know what this work, unless it be the last chapter of another
work. Why that chapter should be singled out, however, is not clear.

25. About 480 B.C.

26. That is, I suppose, the age of Wu Wang and Chou Kung.

27. In the 3rd century B.C.

28. Ssu-ma Jang-chu, whose family name was T’ien, lived in the latter
half of the 6th century B.C., and is also believed to have written a work on
war. See Shih Chi, ch. 64, and infra at the beginning of the INTRODUCTION.

29. See Legge’s Classics, vol. V, Prolegomena p. 27. Legge thinks that the
Tso Chuan must have been written in the 5th century, but not before 424 B.C.

30. See Mencius III. 1. iii. 13-20.

31. When Wu first appears in the Ch’un Ch’iu in 584, it is already
at variance with its powerful neighbor. The Ch’un Ch’iu first
mentions Yueh in 537, the Tso Chuan in 601.

32. This is explicitly stated in the Tso Chuan, XXXII, 2.

33. There is this to be said for the later period, that the feud would tend to
grow more bitter after each encounter, and thus more fully justify the language
used in XI. § 30.

34. With Wu Yuan himself the case is just the reverse:—a spurious
treatise on war has been fathered on him simply because he was a great general.
Here we have an obvious inducement to forgery. Sun Wu, on the other hand,
cannot have been widely known to fame in the 5th century.

35. From Tso Chuan: “From the date of King Chao’s accession [515] there was no
year in which Ch’u was not attacked by Wu.”

36. Preface ad fin: “My family comes from Lo-an, and we are really descended
from Sun Tzu. I am ashamed to say that I only read my ancestor’s work from a
literary point of view, without comprehending the military technique. So long
have we been enjoying the blessings of peace!”

37. Hoa-yin is about 14 miles from T’ung-kuan on the eastern border of
Shensi. The temple in question is still visited by those about the ascent of
the Western Sacred Mountain. It is mentioned in a text as being “situated five
li east of the district city of Hua-yin. The temple contains the
Hua-shan tablet inscribed by the T’ang Emperor Hsuan Tsung [713-755].”

38. See my “Catalogue of Chinese Books” (Luzac & Co., 1908), no. 40.

39. This is a discussion of 29 difficult passages in Sun Tzu.

40. Cf. Catalogue of the library of Fan family at Ningpo: “His commentary is
frequently obscure; it furnishes a clue, but does not fully develop the
meaning.”

41. Wen Hsien T’ung K’ao, ch. 221.

42. It is interesting to note that M. Pelliot has recently discovered chapters
1, 4 and 5 of this lost work in the “Grottos of the Thousand Buddhas.” See
B.E.F.E.O., t. VIII, nos. 3-4, p. 525.

43. The Hsia, the Shang and the Chou. Although the last-named was nominally
existent in Sun Tzu’s day, it retained hardly a vestige of power, and the old
military organization had practically gone by the board. I can suggest no other
explanation of the passage.

44. See Chou Li, xxix. 6-10.

45. T’ung K’ao, ch. 221.

46. This appears to be still extant. See Wylie’s “Notes,” p. 91 (new edition).

47. T’ung K’ao, loc. cit.

48. A notable person in his day. His biography is given in the San Kuo Chih,
ch. 10.

49. See XI. § 58, note.

50. Hou Han Shu, ch. 17 ad init.

51. San Kuo Chih, ch. 54.

52. Sung Shih, ch. 365 ad init.

53. The few Europeans who have yet had an opportunity of acquainting themselves
with Sun Tzu are not behindhand in their praise. In this connection, I may
perhaps be excused for quoting from a letter from Lord Roberts, to whom the
sheets of the present work were submitted previous to publication: “Many of Sun
Wu’s maxims are perfectly applicable to the present day, and no. 11 [in Chapter
VIII] is one that the people of this country would do well to take to heart.”

54. Ch. 140.

55. See IV. § 3.

56. The allusion may be to Mencius VI. 2. ix. 2.

57. The Tso Chuan.

58. Shih Chi, ch. 25, fol. I.

59. Cf. Shih Chi, ch 47.

60. See Shu Ching, preface § 55.

61. See Shih Chi, ch. 47.

62. Lun Yu, XV. 1.

63. I failed to trace this utterance.

64. Supra.

65. Supra.

66. The other four being worship, mourning, entertainment of guests, and
festive rites. See Shu Ching, ii. 1. III. 8, and Chou Li, IX. fol. 49.

67. See XIII. § 11, note.

68. This is a rather obscure allusion to the Tso Chuan, where Tzu-ch’an
says: “If you have a piece of beautiful brocade, you will not employ a mere
learner to make it up.”

69. Cf. Tao Te Ching, ch. 31.

70. Sun Hsing-yen might have quoted Confucius again. See Lun Yu, XIII. 29, 30.

71. Better known as Hsiang Yu [233-202 B.C.].

72. Shih Chi, ch. 47.

73. Shih Chi, ch. 38.

74. See XIII. § 27, note. Further details on T’ai Kung will be found in
the Shih Chi, ch. 32 ad init. Besides the tradition which makes him a former
minister of Chou Hsin, two other accounts of him are there given, according to
which he would appear to have been first raised from a humble private station
by Wen Wang.

Chapter I. LAYING PLANS

1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State.

2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence
it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.

3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into
account in one’s deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions
obtaining in the field.

4. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The Commander; (5)
Method and discipline.

5, 6. The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete accord with their
ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by
any danger.

7. Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons.

8. Earth comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground
and narrow passes; the chances of life and death.

9. The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence,
courage and strictness.

10. By Method and discipline are to be understood the marshaling of the
army in its proper subdivisions, the graduations of rank among the officers,
the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control
of military expenditure.

11. These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows them
will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail.

12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the military
conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in this wise:—

13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law?

(2) Which of the two generals has most ability?
(3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth?

(4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?

(5) Which army is stronger?

(6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained?

(7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and punishment?

14. By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or defeat.

15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will
conquer:—let such a one be retained in command! The general that hearkens
not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:—let such a one be
dismissed!

16. While heading the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any helpful
circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules.

17. According as circumstances are favorable, one should modify one’s plans.

18. All warfare is based on deception.

19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we
must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far
away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.

20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him.

21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior
strength, evade him.

22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be
weak, that he may grow arrogant.

23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest.

If his forces are united, separate them.

24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.

25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged
beforehand.

26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere
the battle is fought.

The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus do
many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much
more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee
who is likely to win or lose.

Chapter II. WAGING WAR

1. Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a
thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand
mail-clad soldiers,

with provisions enough to carry them a thousand li,

the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of guests,
small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor, will
reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost of
raising an army of 100,000 men.

2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then men’s
weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped. If you lay siege to a
town, you will exhaust your strength.

3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be
equal to the strain.

4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength
exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take
advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert
the consequences that must ensue.

5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been
seen associated with long delays.

6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.

7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can
thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on.

8. The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his
supply-wagons loaded more than twice.

9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the
army will have food enough for its needs.

10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by
contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance
causes the people to be impoverished.

11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up; and
high prices cause the people’s substance to be drained away.

12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted by
heavy exactions.

13, 14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of
the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their income will be
dissipated;

while government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, breast-plates
and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantles,
draught-oxen and heavy wagons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue.

15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One cartload
of the enemy’s provisions is equivalent to twenty of one’s own, and likewise a
single picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one’s own store.

16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there
may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.

17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken,
those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags should be
substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in
conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.

18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one’s own strength.

19. In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns.

20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the
people’s fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace
or in peril.

Chapter III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM

1. Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take
the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good.
So, too, it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to
capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them.

2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence;
supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without
fighting.

3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy’s plans;

the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces;

the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field;

and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.

4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided.

The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements of war,
will take up three whole months;

and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more.

5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the
assault like swarming ants,

with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town still
remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege.

6. Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any
fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows
their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.

7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus,
without losing a man, his triumph will be complete.

This is the method of attacking by stratagem.

8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy’s one, to surround
him; if five to one, to attack him;

if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.

9. If equally matched, we can offer battle;

if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy;

if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.

10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end
it must be captured by the larger force.

11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State; if the bulwark is complete at
all points; the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State
will be weak.

12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his
army:—

13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the
fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army.

14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a
kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes
restlessness in the soldier’s minds.

15. (3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination,

through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances.
This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.

16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from
the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and
flinging victory away.

17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory: (1) He will
win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.

(2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.

(3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its
ranks.

(4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.

(5) He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the
sovereign.

18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not
fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy,
for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.

If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.

Chapter IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS

1. Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the
possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the
enemy.

2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the
opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.

3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat,

but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.

4. Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer without being able to
do it.

5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the
enemy means taking the offensive.

6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking, a
superabundance of strength.

7. The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recesses of
the earth;

he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven.

Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the other, a
victory that is complete.

8. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the
acme of excellence.

9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole
Empire says, “Well done!”

“the world’s coarse thumb
And finger fail to plumb.”

10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength;

to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder
is no sign of a quick ear.

11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but
excels in winning with ease.

12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for
courage.

13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes.

Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means
conquering an enemy that is already defeated.

14. Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a position which makes defeat
impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy.

15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after
the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and
afterwards looks for victory.

16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to
method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control success.

17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; secondly,
Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances;
fifthly, Victory.

18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to
Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to
Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances.

19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound’s weight placed in
the scale against a single grain.

20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up waters
into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.

Chapter V. ENERGY

1. Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force is the same principle as the
control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers.

2. Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from
fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and
signals.

3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy’s attack
and remain unshaken—this is effected by manœuvers direct and indirect.

4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against an
egg—this is effected by the science of weak points and strong.

5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but
indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.

6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhausible as Heaven and Earth,
unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and moon, they end but
to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away to return once more.

7. There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these
five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard.

8. There are not more than five primary colors (blue, yellow, red, white, and
black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever been seen.

9 There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, sweet,
bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted.

10. In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack—the direct
and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series
of manœuvers.

11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like
moving in a circle—you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the
possibilities of their combination?

12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll
stones along in its course.

13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which
enables it to strike and destroy its victim.

14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in his
decision.

15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to the
releasing of a trigger.

16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder and
yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array may be
without head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat.

17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline, simulated fear postulates
courage; simulated weakness postulates strength.

18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of
subdivision;

concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent
energy;

masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical dispositions.

19. Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains
deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act.

He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it.

20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body of picked
men he lies in wait for him.

21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and does not
require too much from individuals.

Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize combined energy.

22. When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting men become as it were like
unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain
motionless on level ground, and to move when on a slope; if four-cornered, to
come to a standstill, but if round-shaped, to go rolling down.

23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum of a
round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So much on the
subject of energy.

Chapter VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG

1. Sun Tzu said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the
enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to
hasten to battle will arrive exhausted.

2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not
allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on him.

3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach of his
own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible for the enemy
to draw near.

4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him;

if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped, he can
force him to move.

5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly to
places where you are not expected.

6. An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches through
country where the enemy is not.

7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places
which are undefended.

You can ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold positions that
cannot be attacked.

8. Hence that general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not know what
to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know what to
attack.

9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible,
through you inaudible;

and hence we can hold the enemy’s fate in our hands.

10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy’s
weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more
rapid than those of the enemy.

11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though
he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is
attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve.

12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even
though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. All we
need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in his way.

13. By discovering the enemy’s dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves,
we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy’s must be divided.

14. We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up into
fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a
whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy’s few.

15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior one,
our opponents will be in dire straits.

16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the
enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different
points;

and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall
have to face at any given point will be proportionately few.

17. For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should he
strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he
will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left.
If he sends reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak.

18. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks;
numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make these preparations
against us.

19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may concentrate
from the greatest distances in order to fight.

20. But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be impotent
to succor the right, the right equally impotent to succor the left, the van
unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. How much more so if
the furthest portions of the army are anything under a hundred li apart,
and even the nearest are separated by several li!

21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh exceed our own in
number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then
that victory can be achieved.

22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting.
Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of their success.

23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity.

Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots.

24. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may know
where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient.

25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to
conceal them;

conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest
spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains.

26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy’s own
tactics—that is what the multitude cannot comprehend.

27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the
strategy out of which victory is evolved.

28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your
methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances.

29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs
away from high places and hastens downwards.

30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is
weak.

31. Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it
flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is
facing.

32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are
no constant conditions.

33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby
succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain.

34. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always equally
predominant;

the four seasons make way for each other in turn.

There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and waxing.

Chapter VII. MANOUVERING

1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign.

2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and
harmonize the different elements thereof before pitching his camp.

3. After that, comes tactical manœuvering, than which there is nothing more
difficult.

The difficulty of tactical manœuvering consists in turning the devious into the
direct, and misfortune into gain.

4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy out of
the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the goal before
him, shows knowledge of the artifice of deviation.

5. Manœuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined multitude,
most dangerous.

6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an advantage,
the chances are that you will be too late. On the other hand, to detach a
flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores.

7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, and make forced
marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual distance at a
stretch,

doing a hundred li in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all
your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy.

8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, and on
this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination.

9. If you march fifty li in order to outmanœuver the enemy, you will
lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will reach the
goal.

10. If you march thirty li with the same object, two-thirds of your army
will arrive.

11. We may take it then that an army without its baggage-train is lost; without
provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost.

12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of
our neighbors.

13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the
face of the country—its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and
precipices, its marshes and swamps.

14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account unless we make use
of local guides.

15. In war, practice dissimulation, and you will succeed.

16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by
circumstances.

17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind,

your compactness that of the forest.

18. In raiding and plundering be like fire,

in immovability like a mountain.

19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall
like a thunderbolt.

20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst your men;

when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the benefit of
the soldiery.

21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move.

22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation.

Such is the art of manœuvering.

23. The Book of Army Management says:

On the field of battle,

the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs and
drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution
of banners and flags.

24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and eyes of
the host may be focused on one particular point.

25. The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either for the
brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone.

This is the art of handling large masses of men.

26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires and drums, and in
fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing the ears and
eyes of your army.

27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit;

a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.

28. Now a soldier’s spirit is keenest in the morning;

by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent only on
returning to camp.

29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but
attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of
studying moods.

30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub
amongst the enemy:—this is the art of retaining self-possession.

31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease
while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy is
famished:—this is the art of husbanding one’s strength.

32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect order,
to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident
array:—this is the art of studying circumstances.

33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to
oppose him when he comes downhill.

34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers whose
temper is keen.

35. Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy.

Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.

36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free.

Do not press a desperate foe too hard.

37. Such is the art of warfare.

Chapter VIII. VARIATION OF TACTICS

1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign,
collects his army and concentrates his forces.

2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high roads
intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in dangerously isolated
positions.

In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In desperate position,
you must fight.

3. There are roads which must not be followed,

armies which must be not attacked,

towns which must not be besieged,

positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign which must not
be obeyed.

4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany
variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops.

5. The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted with the
configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge to
practical account.

6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying his
plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will fail to make
the best use of his men.

7. Hence in the wise leader’s plans, considerations of advantage and of
disadvantage will be blended together.

8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may succeed in
accomplishing the essential part of our schemes.

9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always ready to
seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from misfortune.

10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them;

and make trouble for them,

and keep them constantly engaged;

hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point.

11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy’s not
coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not
attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.

12. There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general: (1)
Recklessness, which leads to destruction;

(2) cowardice, which leads to capture;

(3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;

(4) a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame;

This need not be taken to mean that a sense of honor is really a defect in a
general. What Sun Tzu condemns is rather an exaggerated sensitiveness to
slanderous reports, the thin-skinned man who is stung by opprobrium, however
undeserved. Mei Yao-ch’en truly observes, though somewhat paradoxically:
“The seeker after glory should be careless of public opinion.”]

(5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and trouble.

13. These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the conduct of
war.

14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will surely be
found among these five dangerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation.

Chapter IX. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH

1. Sun Tzu said: We come now to the question of encamping the army, and
observing signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over mountains, and keep in the
neighborhood of valleys.

2. Camp in high places,

facing the sun.

Do not climb heights in order to fight. So much for mountain warfare.

3. After crossing a river, you should get far away from it.

4. When an invading force crosses a river in its onward march, do not advance
to meet it in mid-stream. It will be best to let half the army get across, and
then deliver your attack.

5. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet the invader near a
river which he has to cross.

6. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the sun.

Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy.

So much for river warfare.

7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to get over them
quickly, without any delay.

8. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have water and grass near
you, and get your back to a clump of trees.

So much for operations in salt-marches.

9. In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible position with rising
ground to your right and on your rear,

so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind. So much for
campaigning in flat country.

10. These are the four useful branches of military knowledge

which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several sovereigns.

11. All armies prefer high ground to low.

and sunny places to dark.

12. If you are careful of your men,

and camp on hard ground, the army will be free from disease of every kind,

and this will spell victory.

13. When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny side, with the slope on
your right rear. Thus you will at once act for the benefit of your soldiers and
utilize the natural advantages of the ground.

14. When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river which you wish to
ford is swollen and flecked with foam, you must wait until it subsides.

15. Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents running
between, deep natural hollows,

The latter defined as “places enclosed on every side by steep banks, with pools
of water at the bottom.”]

confined places,

tangled thickets,

quagmires

and crevasses,

should be left with all possible speed and not approached.

16. While we keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to approach
them; while we face them, we should let the enemy have them on his rear.

17. If in the neighborhood of your camp there should be any hilly country,
ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow basins filled with reeds, or woods
with thick undergrowth, they must be carefully routed out and searched; for
these are places where men in ambush or insidious spies are likely to be
lurking.

18. When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he is relying on the
natural strength of his position.

19. When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious for the
other side to advance.

20. If his place of encampment is easy of access, he is tendering a bait.

21. Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the enemy is advancing.

The appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass means that
the enemy wants to make us suspicious.

22. The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade.

Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming.

23. When there is dust rising in a high column, it is the sign of chariots
advancing; when the dust is low, but spread over a wide area, it betokens the
approach of infantry.

When it branches out in different directions, it shows that parties have been
sent to collect firewood. A few clouds of dust moving to and fro signify that
the army is encamping.

24. Humble words and increased preparations are signs that the enemy is about
to advance.

Violent language and driving forward as if to the attack are signs that he will
retreat.

25. When the light chariots come out first and take up a position on the wings,
it is a sign that the enemy is forming for battle.

26. Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant indicate a plot.

27. When there is much running about

and the soldiers fall into rank, it means that the critical moment has come.

28. When some are seen advancing and some retreating, it is a lure.

29. When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are faint from want
of food.

30. If those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking themselves, the army
is suffering from thirst.

31. If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and makes no effort to secure
it, the soldiers are exhausted.

32. If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied.

Clamor by night betokens nervousness.

33. If there is disturbance in the camp, the general’s authority is weak. If
the banners and flags are shifted about, sedition is afoot. If the officers are
angry, it means that the men are weary.

34. When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its cattle for food,

and when the men do not hang their cooking-pots over the camp-fires, showing
that they will not return to their tents, you may know that they are determined
to fight to the death.

35. The sight of men whispering together in small knots or speaking in subdued
tones points to disaffection amongst the rank and file.

36. Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his resources;

too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress.

37. To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at the enemy’s numbers,
shows a supreme lack of intelligence.

38. When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is a sign that
the enemy wishes for a truce.

39. If the enemy’s troops march up angrily and remain facing ours for a long
time without either joining battle or taking themselves off again, the
situation is one that demands great vigilance and circumspection.

40. If our troops are no more in number than the enemy, that is amply
sufficient; it only means that no direct attack can be made.

What we can do is simply to concentrate all our available strength, keep a
close watch on the enemy, and obtain reinforcements.

41. He who exercises no forethought but makes light of his opponents is sure to
be captured by them.

42. If soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to you, they will
not prove submissive; and, unless submissive, then will be practically useless.
If, when the soldiers have become attached to you, punishments are not
enforced, they will still be useless.

43. Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first instance with humanity, but
kept under control by means of iron discipline.

This is a certain road to victory.

44. If in training soldiers commands are habitually enforced, the army will be
well-disciplined; if not, its discipline will be bad.

45. If a general shows confidence in his men but always insists on his orders
being obeyed,

the gain will be mutual.

Chapter X. TERRAIN

1. Sun Tzu said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, to wit: (1)
Accessible ground;

(2) entangling ground;

(3) temporizing ground;

(4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous heights; (6) positions at a great distance
from the enemy.

2. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called
accessible.

3. With regard to ground of this nature, be before the enemy in occupying the
raised and sunny spots, and carefully guard your line of supplies.

Then you will be able to fight with advantage.

4. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called entangling.

5. From a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may sally
forth and defeat him. But if the enemy is prepared for your coming, and you
fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible, disaster will ensue.

6. When the position is such that neither side will gain by making the first
move, it is called temporizing ground.

7. In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer us an
attractive bait,

it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus enticing
the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has come out, we may deliver
our attack with advantage.

8. With regard to narrow passes, if you can occupy them first, let them be
strongly garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy.

9. Should the army forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after him if
the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly garrisoned.

10. With regard to precipitous heights, if you are beforehand with your
adversary, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there wait for him
to come up.

11. If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him, but retreat
and try to entice him away.

12. If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, and the strength of
the two armies is equal, it is not easy to provoke a battle,

and fighting will be to your disadvantage.

13. These six are the principles connected with Earth.

The general who has attained a responsible post must be careful to study them.

14. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising from natural
causes, but from faults for which the general is responsible. These are: (1)
Flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin; (5) disorganization; (6)
rout.

15. Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled against another ten
times its size, the result will be the flight of the former.

16. When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too weak, the
result is insubordination.

When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak, the result
is collapse.

17. When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, and on meeting the
enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of resentment, before the
commander-in-chief can tell whether or no he is in a position to fight, the
result is ruin.

18. When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are not
clear and distinct;

when there are no fixes duties assigned to officers and men,

and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the result is utter
disorganization.

19. When a general, unable to estimate the enemy’s strength, allows an inferior
force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful
one, and neglects to place picked soldiers in the front rank, the result must
be rout.

20. These are six ways of courting defeat, which must be carefully noted by the
general who has attained a responsible post.

21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier’s best ally;

but a power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the forces of victory,
and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and distances, constitutes
the test of a great general.

22. He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into
practice, will win his battles. He who knows them not, nor practices them, will
surely be defeated.

23. If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight, even though
the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in victory, then you must not
fight even at the ruler’s bidding.

24. The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without fearing
disgrace,

whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for his
sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom.

25. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you into the
deepest valleys; look upon them as your own beloved sons, and they will stand
by you even unto death.

26. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority felt;
kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your commands; and incapable, moreover, of
quelling disorder: then your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; they
are useless for any practical purpose.

27. If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware
that the enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only halfway towards
victory.

28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that our own
men are not in a condition to attack, we have gone only halfway towards
victory.

29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our men are
in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature of the ground makes
fighting impracticable, we have still gone only halfway towards victory.

30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered; once he
has broken camp, he is never at a loss.

31. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory
will not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and know Earth, you may make your
victory complete.

Chapter XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS

1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war recognizes nine varieties of ground: (1)
Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground; (4) open ground;
(5) ground of intersecting highways; (6) serious ground; (7) difficult ground;
(8) hemmed-in ground; (9) desperate ground.

2. When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive ground.

3. When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great distance, it
is facile ground.

4. Ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either side, is
contentious ground.

5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground.

6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states,

so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his command,

is a ground of intersecting highways.

7. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, leaving a
number of fortified cities in its rear, it is serious ground.

8. Mountain forests,

rugged steeps, marshes and fens—all country that is hard to traverse:
this is difficult ground.

9. Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can only
retire by tortuous paths, so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to
crush a large body of our men: this is hemmed in ground.

10. Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting without
delay, is desperate ground.

11. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt not. On
contentious ground, attack not.

12. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy’s way.

On the ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your allies.

13. On serious ground, gather in plunder.

In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march.

14. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem.

On desperate ground, fight.

15. Those who were called skillful leaders of old knew how to drive a wedge
between the enemy’s front and rear;

to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; to hinder the
good troops from rescuing the bad, the officers from rallying their men.

16. When the enemy’s men were united, they managed to keep them in disorder.

17. When it was to their advantage, they made a forward move; when otherwise,
they stopped still.

18. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly array and on
the point of marching to the attack, I should say: “Begin by seizing something
which your opponent holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will.”

19. Rapidity is the essence of war:

take advantage of the enemy’s unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes,
and attack unguarded spots.

20. The following are the principles to be observed by an invading force: The
further you penetrate into a country, the greater will be the solidarity of
your troops, and thus the defenders will not prevail against you.

21. Make forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with food.

22. Carefully study the well-being of your men,

and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your strength.

Keep your army continually on the move,

and devise unfathomable plans.

23. Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no escape, and they will
prefer death to flight. If they will face death, there is nothing they may not
achieve.

Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength.

24. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. If there is no
place of refuge, they will stand firm. If they are in hostile country, they
will show a stubborn front. If there is no help for it, they will fight hard.

25. Thus, without waiting to be marshaled, the soldiers will be constantly on
the qui vive; without waiting to be asked, they will do your will;

without restrictions, they will be faithful; without giving orders, they can be
trusted.

26. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with superstitious doubts. Then,
until death itself comes, no calamity need be feared.

27. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is not because they
have a distaste for riches; if their lives are not unduly long, it is not
because they are disinclined to longevity.

28. On the day they are ordered out to battle, your soldiers may weep,

those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those lying down letting the
tears run down their cheeks.

But let them once be brought to bay, and they will display the courage of a Chu
or a Kuei.

29. The skillful tactician may be likened to the shuai-jan. Now the shuai-jan
is a snake that is found in the Ch’ang mountains.

Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail; strike at its tail,
and you will be attacked by its head; strike at its middle, and you will be
attacked by head and tail both.

30. Asked if an army can be made to imitate the shuai-jan,

I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yueh are enemies;

yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm,
they will come to each other’s assistance just as the left hand helps the
right.

31. Hence it is not enough to put one’s trust in the tethering of horses, and
the burying of chariot wheels in the ground.

32. The principle on which to manage an army is to set up one standard of
courage which all must reach.

33. How to make the best of both strong and weak—that is a question
involving the proper use of ground.

34. Thus the skillful general conducts his army just as though he were leading
a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand.

35. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus ensure secrecy;
upright and just, and thus maintain order.

36. He must be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports and
appearances,

and thus keep them in total ignorance.

37. By altering his arrangements and changing his plans,

he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge.

By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents the enemy from
anticipating his purpose.

38. At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one who has climbed
up a height and then kicks away the ladder behind him. He carries his men deep
into hostile territory before he shows his hand.

39. He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a shepherd driving a
flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and that, and nothing knows whither
he is going.

40. To muster his host and bring it into danger:—this may be termed the
business of the general.

41. The different measures suited to the nine varieties of ground;

the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics; and the fundamental laws of
human nature: these are things that must most certainly be studied.

42. When invading hostile territory, the general principle is, that penetrating
deeply brings cohesion; penetrating but a short way means dispersion.

43. When you leave your own country behind, and take your army across
neighborhood territory, you find yourself on critical ground.

When there are means of communication on all four sides, the ground is one of
intersecting highways.

44. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground. When you
penetrate but a little way, it is facile ground.

45. When you have the enemy’s strongholds on your rear, and narrow passes in
front, it is hemmed-in ground. When there is no place of refuge at all, it is
desperate ground.

46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men with unity of
purpose.

On facile ground, I would see that there is close connection between all parts
of my army.

47. On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear.

48. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on my defenses. On ground of
intersecting highways, I would consolidate my alliances.

49. On serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous stream of supplies.

On difficult ground, I would keep pushing on along the road.

50. On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way of retreat.

On desperate ground, I would proclaim to my soldiers the hopelessness of saving
their lives.

Tu Yu says: “Burn your baggage and impedimenta, throw away your stores and
provisions, choke up the wells, destroy your cooking-stoves, and make it plain
to your men that they cannot survive, but must fight to the death.” Mei
Yao-ch’en says: “The only chance of life lies in giving up all hope of
it.” This concludes what Sun Tzu has to say about “grounds” and the
“variations” corresponding to them. Reviewing the passages which bear on this
important subject, we cannot fail to be struck by the desultory and
unmethodical fashion in which it is treated. Sun Tzu begins abruptly in VIII. §
2 to enumerate “variations” before touching on “grounds” at all, but only
mentions five, namely nos. 7, 5, 8 and 9 of the subsequent list, and one that
is not included in it. A few varieties of ground are dealt with in the earlier
portion of chap. IX, and then chap. X sets forth six new grounds, with six
variations of plan to match. None of these is mentioned again, though the first
is hardly to be distinguished from ground no. 4 in the next chapter. At last,
in chap. XI, we come to the Nine Grounds par excellence, immediately followed
by the variations. This takes us down to § 14. In §§ 43-45, fresh definitions
are provided for nos. 5, 6, 2, 8 and 9 (in the order given), as well as for the
tenth ground noticed in chap. VIII; and finally, the nine variations are
enumerated once more from beginning to end, all, with the exception of 5, 6 and
7, being different from those previously given. Though it is impossible to
account for the present state of Sun Tzu’s text, a few suggestive facts maybe
brought into prominence: (1) Chap. VIII, according to the title, should deal
with nine variations, whereas only five appear. (2) It is an abnormally short
chapter. (3) Chap. XI is entitled The Nine Grounds. Several of these are
defined twice over, besides which there are two distinct lists of the
corresponding variations. (4) The length of the chapter is disproportionate,
being double that of any other except IX. I do not propose to draw any
inferences from these facts, beyond the general conclusion that Sun Tzu’s work
cannot have come down to us in the shape in which it left his hands: chap. VIII
is obviously defective and probably out of place, while XI seems to contain
matter that has either been added by a later hand or ought to appear
elsewhere.]

51. For it is the soldier’s disposition to offer an obstinate resistance when
surrounded, to fight hard when he cannot help himself, and to obey promptly
when he has fallen into danger.

52. We cannot enter into alliance with neighboring princes until we are
acquainted with their designs. We are not fit to lead an army on the march
unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its mountains and
forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. We shall be
unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make use of local
guides.

53. To be ignored of any one of the following four or five principles does not
befit a warlike prince.

54. When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his generalship shows
itself in preventing the concentration of the enemy’s forces. He overawes his
opponents, and their allies are prevented from joining against him.

55. Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and sundry, nor does he
foster the power of other states. He carries out his own secret designs,
keeping his antagonists in awe.

Thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their kingdoms.

56. Bestow rewards without regard to rule,

issue orders

without regard to previous arrangements;

and you will be able to handle a whole army as though you had to do with but a
single man.

57. Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let them know your
design.

When the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes; but tell them nothing
when the situation is gloomy.

58. Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive; plunge it into
desperate straits, and it will come off in safety.

59. For it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm’s way that is capable
of striking a blow for victory.

60. Success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating ourselves to the
enemy’s purpose.

61. By persistently hanging on the enemy’s flank,

we shall succeed in the long run

in killing the commander-in-chief.

62. This is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer cunning.

63. On the day that you take up your command, block the frontier passes,
destroy the official tallies,

and stop the passage of all emissaries.

64. Be stern in the council-chamber,

so that you may control the situation.

65. If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in.

66. Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear,

and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground.

67. Walk in the path defined by rule,

and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive battle.

68. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until the enemy gives you
an opening; afterwards emulate the rapidity of a running hare, and it will be
too late for the enemy to oppose you.

Chapter XII. THE ATTACK BY FIRE

1. Sun Tzu said: There are five ways of attacking with fire. The first is to
burn soldiers in their camp;

the second is to burn stores;

the third is to burn baggage trains;

the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines;

the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy.

2. In order to carry out an attack, we must have means available.

the material for raising fire should always be kept in readiness.

3. There is a proper season for making attacks with fire, and special days for
starting a conflagration.

4. The proper season is when the weather is very dry; the special days are
those when the moon is in the constellations of the Sieve, the Wall, the Wing
or the Cross-bar;

for these four are all days of rising wind.

5. In attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet five possible
developments:

6. (1) When fire breaks out inside to enemy’s camp, respond at once with an
attack from without.

7. (2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy’s soldiers remain quiet,
bide your time and do not attack.

8. (3) When the force of the flames has reached its height, follow it up with
an attack, if that is practicable; if not, stay where you are.

9. (4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire from without, do not wait
for it to break out within, but deliver your attack at a favorable moment.

10. (5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it. Do not attack from the
leeward.

11. A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a night breeze soon falls.

12. In every army, the five developments connected with fire must be known, the
movements of the stars calculated, and a watch kept for the proper days.

13. Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence; those
who use water as an aid to the attack gain an accession of strength.

14. By means of water, an enemy may be intercepted, but not robbed of all his
belongings.

15. Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and succeed in his
attacks without cultivating the spirit of enterprise; for the result is waste
of time and general stagnation.

16. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead; the good
general cultivates his resources.

17. Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless there is
something to be gained; fight not unless the position is critical.

18. No ruler should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own spleen;
no general should fight a battle simply out of pique.

19. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where you
are.

20. Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may be succeeded by content.

21. But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again into being;

nor can the dead ever be brought back to life.

22. Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general full of
caution. This is the way to keep a country at peace and an army intact.

Chapter XIII. THE USE OF SPIES

1. Sun Tzu said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching them
great distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on the resources
of the State. The daily expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces of silver.

There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop down exhausted on
the highways.

As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in their labor.

2. Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the victory which
is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in ignorance of the
enemy’s condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of
silver in honors and emoluments,

is the height of inhumanity.

3. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his sovereign, no
master of victory.

4. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and
conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge.

5. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be
obtained inductively from experience,

nor by any deductive calculation.

6. Knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions can only be obtained from other men.

7. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: (1) Local spies; (2)
inward spies; (3) converted spies; (4) doomed spies; (5) surviving spies.

8. When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the secret
system. This is called “divine manipulation of the threads.” It is the
sovereign’s most precious faculty.

9. Having local spies means employing the services of the inhabitants of a
district.

10. Having inward spies, making use of officials of the enemy.

11. Having converted spies, getting hold of the enemy’s spies and using them
for our own purposes.

12. Having doomed spies, doing certain things openly for purposes of
deception, and allowing our spies to know of them and report them to the enemy.

13. Surviving spies, finally, are those who bring back news from the
enemy’s camp.

14. Hence it is that which none in the whole army are more intimate relations
to be maintained than with spies.

None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other business should greater
secrecy be preserved.

15. Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive sagacity.

16. They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and
straightforwardness.

17. Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the truth of
their reports.

18. Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every kind of business.

19. If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is ripe, he
must be put to death together with the man to whom the secret was told.

20. Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or to assassinate
an individual, it is always necessary to begin by finding out the names of the
attendants, the aides-de- camp,

and door-keepers and sentries of the general in command. Our spies must be
commissioned to ascertain these.

21. The enemy’s spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out, tempted
with bribes, led away and comfortably housed. Thus they will become converted
spies and available for our service.

22. It is through the information brought by the converted spy that we are able
to acquire and employ local and inward spies.

23. It is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed spy to
carry false tidings to the enemy.

24. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used on
appointed occasions.

25. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of the
enemy; and this knowledge can only be derived, in the first instance, from the
converted spy.

Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the utmost
liberality.

26. Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty

was due to I Chih

who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise of the Chou dynasty was due
to Lu Ya

who had served under the Yin.

27. Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who will use
the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying and thereby they
achieve great results.

Spies are a most important element in war, because on them depends an army’s
ability to move.